"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “B” BENCH, KOLKATA Before Shri Rajesh Kumar, Accountant Member and Shri Pradip Kumar Choubey, Judicial Member ITA No 1306 /KOL/2026 Assessment Year- 2017-18 Jabir Alam.......................................................................................................Appellant SO Hamiruddin Bhaispita, Chopra, North Dinajpur- 733207 West Bengal- 733207 [PAN No. BBOPA7671K] Vs. Income Tax Office, Karnajora...........................,..……………....……….Respondent Raiganj- 733130 Appearances by: Rajib Mukherjee, A.R., appeared on behalf of the Appellant. Ambrish Mishra, Sr. DR, appeared on behalf of the Respondent. Date of concluding the hearing: August 19, 2026 Date of pronouncing the order: September 30 ,2026 ORDER Per Pradip Kumar Choubey, Judicial Member: This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order dated 15.01.2026 of the Office of the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi passed under Section 147 of the Assessment Year 2017-18 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 2. At the very outset, it appears from the report of the Registry that the appeal has been filed for a delay of 9 days. The assessee has filed an affidavit to condone the delay. Going over the contents of the petition, the delay is hereby condoned. 3. The brief facts of the case of the assessee is that the assessee here in - after appellant was carrying on supply business of pineapples and the appellant Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 2 had deposited his sale proceeds in cash, including cash of Rs.9,85,000/- in his bankaccount with Central Bank of India during the year. The appellant had withdrawn a total sum of Rs.2,77,81,000/- from his bank account with State Bank of India out of deposits of his sale proceeds of pineapples for payments to farmers from whom he had purchased pineapples. The Ld. AO treating both the aforesaid transactions in /through the bank accounts of the appellant as unexplained money and added back a total sum of Rs.2,87,66,000/- under section 69A of the Act, 1961. The Ld. AO had also added back a sum of Rs. 12,97,500/- being investment in purchase through the disclosed bank account of the appellant with Central Bank of India, out of earlier deposits of his sale proceeds in the said bank account. Aggrieved by the said order assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A) wherein appeal of the assessee has been dismissed as there was a delay of 400 days. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied the assessee preferred appeal before us. 4. The Ld. AR instead of arguing into the merit of the case has only prayed that appeal of assessee be remitted back to the file of the AO for a fresh order on merit as AO has also passed an ex-parte order. The Ld. AR submits that CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal on account of delay though the assessee has filed petition to condone the delay but that has not been considered. Contrary to that Ld. DR though supports the impugned order but did not raise any objection in remitting the appeal of the assessee to the file of the AO. 5. Upon hearing the submission of the counsel of the respective parties and on perusal of the order of the CIT(A) we find that CIT(A) has dismissed the Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 3 appeal as there was a delay of 400 days in filing the appeal. The submission of the AR is that assessee did not receive any physical copy of the assessment order and, assessee did not have taxable income and tax liability so did not file return of income. The submission of the AR is that assessee had received a phone call for department for payment of outstanding dues and penalty then he became aware about an ex-parte order passed by the Assessing Officers and immediately assessee filed an appeal, so the delay was bona fide and genuine. 5.1. In this context, we have perused the several decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and find that in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575], this Court reiterated the following classic statement from Krishna vs. Chathappan [1890 ILR 13 Mad 269]: \"... Section 5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words `sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.\" In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998 (7) SCC 123], this Court held: 5.\"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 4 first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 2. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice...... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. 3. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words \"sufficient cause\" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.” 5.2. Considering the facts of the case and going over the judgment passed by the Supreme Court delay is hereby condoned. Since the order passed by the Assessing Officer is also an ex-parte, hence we are remitting the appeal of the assessee to the file of the AO with a direction to pass an order after affording an opportunity to hear the assessee. 6. Accordingly, order passed by the lower authorities are hereby set aside and the appeal of the assessee be remitted back to the file of the AO for fresh consideration. Assessee is directed to cooperate in the remand proceedings. In the result appeal is allowed for statistical purpose. Kolkata, the 30th September , 2026. Sd/- Sd/- [Rajesh Kumar] Pradip Kumar Choubey] Accountant Member Judicial Member Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 5 DC Dated: 30 .09.2026. Copy of the order forwarded to: 1. Appellant - 2. Respondent - 3. CIT(A)- 4. CIT- 5. CIT(DR) //True copy// By order 3 Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 6 Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.1306/Kol/2026 7 Printed from counselvise.com "